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Abstract 
The convenience provided by cloud computing has led to an increasing trend of many business 
organizations, government agencies and individual customers to migrate their services and data into cloud 
environments. However, once clients’ data is migrated, the overall security control will be immedicably 
shifted form data owners to the hand of cloud service providers. In fact, most cloud clients do not even 
know where their data is physically stored, and therefore the question of how to limit data access to 
authorized users has been one of the biggest challenges in cloud environments. Although security tokens 
and passwords are widely used form of remote user authentication, they can be lost or stolen as they are 
not linked with the identity of data owner. Therefore, biometric based authentication can potentially offer 
a practical and reliable option for remote access control. This chapter starts with a brief introduction that 
covers the fundamental concepts of cloud computing and biometric based authentication. It then provides 
and in-depth discussions on authentication challenges for the cloud computing environment and the 
limitation of traditional solutions. This leads to the key sections related to biometric solutions for cloud 
computing in which we present state-of-art approaches that offer convenient and privacy-preserving 
authentication needed for cloud environment. The chapter argues that addressing privacy concerns 
surrounding the use of biometrics in cloud computing is one of the key challenges that has to be an integral 
part of any viable solution for any biometric-based authentication. It also argues that assuring cloud clients 
that their biometric templates will not be used without their permission to, for example, track them is not 
enough. Such solutions should make it technically infeasible to do so even if a cloud service provider wants 
to. This chapter explains a number of interesting solutions that have been recently proposed to improve 
security and, at the same time, maintain user privacy. Finally, we identify some challenges that still need 
to be addressed and highlight relevant Research Directions.    
Keywords: Could computing, remote biometric authentication, fuzzy identify based encryption, multi-
factor authentication.   
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1. Introduction  
Over the last few years, cloud computing has become one of the fastest growing IT environments for 
providing services to individuals and businesses of all sizes. Cloud computing, as defined by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is "a model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand 
network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort 
or service provider interaction” [1]. The so-called Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) are the key players in 
cloud computing responsible for providing clients with a wide range of services that vary from applications 
such Microsoft Office 365 and Google Docs to a complete infrastructure such as Amazon Elastic Compute 
Cloud (EC2) [2].  This introductory section provides the reader with a brief background on four related 
topics: 1) the main characteristics of cloud computing, delivery models, and deployment models, 2) security 
challenges in cloud computing, 3) biometric based recognition and, 4) the limitations of conventional 
biometric solutions for remote cloud authentication. 
1.1. Cloud computing 
The convenience provided by cloud computing has led to an increasing trend of many business 
organizations, government agencies and customers to migrate their services and data into cloud 
environments. The recent success of cloud computing in attracting such a great attention can be attributed 
to the following five characteristics [2]:  
 On-demand self-service: A client can immediately get computing resources (e.g., CPU time, 
applications, network storage, etc.) without a need for human intervention at the CSP side.p 
 Broad network access: Cloud resources are network accessible from different clients’ applications 
installed on different platforms such as smart phones, tablets, PCs, and laptops.   
 Resource pooling: The CSPs aggregate their resources to meet clients’ need by utilizing multi-tenant 
approaches based on physical as well as virtual resources which can be dynamically added or 
withdrawn based on clients’ requirements. The pooling factor means that the clients do not need to 
know where the resources are coming from or where the data is physically stored.  
 Rapid elasticity: The capabilities of cloud services should be flexible enough to rapidly shrink or 
expand to meet the requirements of different clients at different times.  
 Measured service: CSPs have the ability to measure any resources used by each tenant (client) using 
charge-per-use mechanisms.    
Cloud services are typically delivered to clients using pre-packaged combinations of IT resources provided 
by CSPs based on one of the following three common cloud service models [3]. 
Software as a Service (SaaS): This model of delivery is also called "on-demand software". The software 
and associated data are centrally hosted on CSP’s servers (i.e. instead of using a software install on Clients’ 
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machine, they can use it as a service where no maintenance or upgrades are required). In this model, clients 
have no control or management permission over the underlying cloud infrastructure. Common examples 
of SaaS include Google Docs, Dropbox, and Microsoft Office 365. 
Platform as a Service (PaaS): This kind of service is typically used by application developers. This type 
of service provides access to computing platforms that include operating systems, programming languages, 
software tools, databases, web servers, etc. The clients have control only over their deployed applications. 
Some examples of PaaS include Google AppEngine, Microsoft Azure, and Apache Stratos.   
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS): This delivery model supplies clients with computing resources 
(physical or more often virtual) processors, storage, firewalls, load balancers, virtual local area networks, 
and so on. Therefore, the clients are not only able to deploy and execute various software but they also 
have control over the operating systems, storage, processing power, and networking components. Amazon's 
EC2 is a very good example of IaaS.  
The above three categories of services can be deployed in different environments. Deployment models 
define ownership and the size of cloud resources, and most importantly define who can access them. 
Currently, four basic models of deployment have been identified by the cloud community [3]. 
 Private Cloud Computing: The cloud infrastructure and services are offered exclusively to one 
enterprise, and it might be owned, managed as well as operated by the enterprise, a third party or a 
combination of both. This deployment model not only gets an optimal use of existing in-house 
resources but it also provides better data security and privacy. It should be noted that the cloud 
environment in this model might be located in or outside of the premises of the enterprise. 
 Community cloud computing: The cloud infrastructure is shared by a group of clients or 
organizations to provide shared policies, values, and security procedures. The ownership, management, 
and operation of this model are given to one or more members of the group.  
 Public Cloud Computing: The cloud infrastructure is open for public use. The ownership and 
management are given to business, academic institutes, government bodies, and so on.  
 Hybrid Cloud Computing: More than one deployment models can be combined to form a hybrid 
cloud environment to meet clients’ needs.  
It can be argued that each type of service and deployment model meets the demands of some business more 
than others. For example, while a large enterprise might benefit from the private cloud, smaller businesses 
will most likely opt for a public cloud for cost consideration. Figure 1 illustrates typical cloud computing 
service layers along with their cost and timeline impact.  
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Figure 1. Typical Layers of Cloud Computing Services (adapted from [2]) 
 
1.2. Security challenges in cloud computing  
Although cloud computing offers great advantages over other traditional IT solution, it poses serious 
security concerns. In fact, security and privacy are essential factors for an enterprise when deciding on 
whether to migrate their data, applications, and other relevant services to cloud environments. Service 
agreements between clients and CSPs tend to include details on how to access and utilize cloud services, 
service duration, and data storage and management when the contract ends [1]. However, the main 
challenge is how to guarantee that the data is accessible by authorized users only. When data owners decide 
to use the cloud environment, they rely entirely on third parties to make decisions about their data. 
Therefore, it is very important for data owners to have the right technologies or methods to prevent CSPs 
from utilizing such data without their permission. Both technical and non-technical methods have to 
provide effective means to fulfil this goal [4] [5]. A wide range of possible solutions have been proposed 
to implement different mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access to cloud data even by untrusted CSPs 
[6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11].  In general, to address clients’ concerns about security and privacy of the cloud 
environment, the following three essential challenges must be addressed [4]: 
 Outsourcing: In the traditional IT environment, clients can exercise full control over their data. 
However, they usually lose all means of physical control over the data once it is migrated to cloud 
environments, which is the key security concern. To overcome this problem, clients need to ensure that 
the cloud services providers are trustworthy and are capable of meeting the requirements related to 
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secure data storage, correctness and integrity of cloud data and computation at all times, and 
maintaining clients’ privacy. 
 Multi-tenancy: Cloud environments can share their resources and services among multiple clients 
simultaneously. Both the virtual machines provided by CSPs and the cloud data of different clients are 
eventually located on a single physical machine based on particular resource allocation policy. Hence, 
a legitimate cloud client can potentially act as an adversary by exploiting some holes in the policies to 
gain unauthorized access to the data of other users.  
 Big data and intensive computation: Cloud environment requires dealing with large volumes of data 
supported by powerful processing capabilities. Hence, traditional security techniques might be difficult 
to apply on such data because of the volume of high computation and communication overheads. For 
instance, to guarantee the integrity of remotely stored data, it is computationally infeasible to hash the 
whole data. Consequently, new strategies and protocols are needed to overcome such difficulties. 
1.3. Biometric Authentication 
In the cloud environment, a reliable identity management system is a key component to prevent identity 
theft and control access to different resources. Establishing the correct identity of a person is an essential 
task in any identity management system. Typically, there are three ways to authenticate an individual, each 
of which has its own advantages and limitations [12]: 
 Knowledge-based authentication, or “something you know”, that typically relies on a memorized 
password or PIN. A random 12-character password, for example, offers a strong security mechanism 
for user authentication. However, in practice, humans have difficulties in memorizing complex 
passwords, and passwords that they can easily remember are often short and therefore simple to guess 
or determined by a brute-force / dictionary attack.  
 Object-based authentication, or “something you have”, which relies on the physical possession of an 
object, such as a token. The main drawback of a physical token is that, when lost or stolen, an impostor 
can easily gain unauthorized access.  
 Identity-based authentication, or “something you are”, biometric-based authentication offers an 
advantage over other authentication factors in that a genuine user does not need to remember or carry 
anything. Moreover, biometric-based authentication is known to be more reliable than traditional 
authentication because it is directly linked with the identity of individuals. This is practically important 
for cloud environments as it associates data access with its ownership.  However, biometric systems 
were not initially design for remote authentication in cloud environments. In fact, they can be subject 
to replay attack and, unlike other credentials such as PINs, passwords, or smart cards, once biometric 
related information is compromised, it is impossible to be changed again. 
Biometric systems in general aim to identify or verify an individual’s identity based on physical 
characteristics (e.g., face, iris, fingerprint, DNA, or hand geometry), and/or behavioural characteristics (e.g. 
speech, gait, or signature). A typical biometric system has two stages, enrolment and recognition. Figure 2 
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illustrates the process of the biometric enrolment stage, in which a user starts by presenting their biometric 
data to a biometric sensor (usually in a controlled environment). If the quality of the captured biometric 
sample is found to be adequate, the enrolment process proceeds to a pre-processing procedure to prepare 
the sample for the next step. A feature extraction technique is then used to extract a digital discriminating 
feature vector of the individual, called Biometric Template (BT), which will then be stored (often also 
called “enrolled”) alongside the individual’s identifier (ID) in a database. 
 
 
Figure 2. A typical enrolment stage of a biometric system (the face image was used from the Extended 
Yale Face Database B [13])  
 
At the recognition stage, biometric systems can function in two modes depending on the application 
context, namely authentication or identification mode. 
Biometric-based authentication (also known as verification) is a one-to-one comparison of a freshly 
captured biometric sample(s), known as query, against an enrolled BT as illustrated in Figure 2. In this 
mode, a user claims an identity and the biometric system verifies the authenticity of the claimed identity 
(e.g., the system answers the question: “Are you who you say you are?”). For example, authentication 
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might be used when a user wants to access his/her bank account or computer. The matching process uses a 
distance or similarity function to calculate a score indicating the similarity between the stored BT and the 
fresh feature vector extracted from the query sample. If the matching score is high enough, i.e. close enough 
to the enrolled template, the biometric system grants access to the user. Otherwise the requested access is 
rejected. The term “high enough” is determined by the administrator depending on the level of tolerance 
necessary for the specific application. This allows the system administrator to adjust the rates of false 
acceptance (i.e. wrongly accepted imposters as genuine users) and false rejection (i.e., wrongly rejected 
genuine users) to the desired levels. Typically, there is a trade-off between the False Acceptance Rate 
(FAR) and the False Rejection Rate (FRR), in which the reduction of one rate causes an increase in the 
other. Most biometric systems are configured to be highly secure by maintaining a very low (e.g. 1 in 
10,000) FAR and an acceptable FRR. It is generally less problematic to have a false rejection by asking the 
genuine user to re-scan their biometric, rather than a false acceptance in which an unauthorized individual 
will be granted access. 
1.4. The limitations of conventional biometric for remote authentication  
As we have mentioned previously, many business organisations, government agencies and customers are 
rapidly shifting many of their services and data onto the cloud which has necessitated the need for secure 
remote authentication schemes that are immune from fraud and identity theft. Although a biometric-based 
authentication system is known to be more reliable than traditional authentication schemes, biometric 
systems can be subject to failure due to the intrinsic factors mentioned earlier or adversary attacks. The 
security of biometric remote cloud-based authentication in particular can be undermined in a number of 
ways. For example, a biometric template can be replaced by an imposter’s template in the cloud database 
or it could be stolen and replayed [14]. As a result, the imposter will gain unauthorized access to a place or 
a system. Moreover, it has been shown that it is possible to create a physical spoof starting from biometric 
templates [15]. Adler et.al proposed a “hill climbing attack” [16] on a biometric system which in a finite 
number of iterations, generate a good approximation of the target template. Another method has been also 
proposed in [17] to reconstruct fingerprint images from standard templates which might fool fingerprint 
recognition. Furthermore, biometric data on its own is not very secret. Individuals usually unintentionally 
leave (poor-quality) fingerprints everywhere, and a hidden camera can capture a picture of a face or an iris 
[18]. In fact, the level of secrecy varies among different biometric modalities (e.g., covertly collecting face 
images or voice samples is much easier compared to collecting retina and palm vein samples). 
Remote biometric authentication in cloud environments is particularly vulnerable to eight possible points 
of attack highlighted by Ratha et al. [19]. As illustrated in Figure 3, Attack 1 occurs when an attacker 
presents fake biometric sample at the sensor such as photo of a face, fake fingerprint, copy of a signature, 
and a recorder voice. Attacks 2 and 4 are replay attacks by resubmitting an old signal by bypassing the 
sensor or the feature extractor. Attacks 3 and 5 are Trojan horses that produce feature set or matching score 
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chosen by the attacker. Attack 6 is to target the enrolled templates database stored on the cloud and tamper 
with the template values. Attack 7 is on the channel between the template database and the matcher where 
an attacker might tamper with the template before it reaches the matcher. Finally, attack 8 is to override the 
decision by the attacker. 
 
Figure 3. Eight points of attacks in a biometric authentication system (adapted from [19]) 
 
Most of the eight points of attacks explained above can be exploited in unattended remote authentication 
when accessing cloud resource. Therefore, the deployment of such systems for remote authentication is 
still very limited. Solutions such as cancellable biometric systems and biometric cryptosystems are 
inherently not immune to replay, man-in-the-middle, and other remote attacks. This necessitate a need for 
new innovative solutions that help in fraud detection and identity theft prevention in cloud environment as 
highlighted in section 3. 
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2. Authentication challenges for the cloud computing environment 
With more individuals and organizations opting to use cloud storage service, remote access control to 
data and cloud resources is becoming a key requirement. This is particularly important as cloud clients 
do not usually know where their data is physically stored (i.e., the overall security control has shifted 
form data owners to the hand of service providers [3]). Therefore, the question of how to limit data access 
to the data owner and authorized user has been one of the biggest challenges in cloud environments. 
Combination of ID cards and passwords/PINs-based authentication is the most widely used form of 
remote user authentication [5]. As such authentication factors are not linked with the identity of data 
owner (see section 1.3), biometric authentication seems the ideal option for access control. However, 
employing biometric based solutions for cloud authentication is far from a straightforward task due 
security issues highlighted in section 1.4. Although biometric authentication is perceived to be more 
reliable than traditional authentication schemes, the open nature of unattended remote authentication 
makes biometric systems vulnerable to replay and other remote fraudulent attacks. Generally speaking, 
an effective remote authentication in cloud environments has to be a component of a security package 
that meets the following requirements [3]: 
 The original data should be intractable to restore by cloud providers.  
 Offering effective means to distinguish between legitimate users and impostors, and prevent 
the latter from gaining unauthorized access.  
 Preventing any intruder from altering original messages.  
 Minimizing response-time to clients’ requests, which is a vital requirement for security 
mechanisms that rely on timestamp synchronization.   
2.1. Traditional biometric solutions for cloud authentication 
The concept of revocable or cancellable biometric templates generates biometric templates that are not 
fixed over time. In this case, such templates can be revoked in the same way as lost PINs or passwords 
[20]. Biometric cryptosystems, on the other hand, aim to generate biometric keys and bio-hashes that are 
used as a proof of identity instead of biometric templates. In general, the key approaches to protect 
biometric templates rely on the use of a non-invertible secret transformations on the biometric feature 
vectors [21].  
An interesting implementation of revocable biometrics schemes is the Multi-Factor Biometric 
Authentication (MFBA) which makes use User-Based Transformations (UBTs) on biometric feature 
vectors. These MFBA schemes have been proposed to improve security and privacy of biometric systems. 
Figure 4 shows the key steps of a MFBA system based on the UBT approach at the enrolment and 
authentication stages. UBTs tend to use transformation keys produced from passwords/PINs or stored on a 
token. 
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Figure 4. Key steps of a MFBA system based on applying UBTs at the enrolment and authentication 
stages 
It can be argued that revocable biometric systems and biometric cryptosystems enhance the overall security 
and user’s privacy but at the same time they are inherently not robust against replay, man-in-the-middle, 
and other remote attacks in cloud environments.  
Another traditional approach to remote biometric authentication relies on combining MFBA with 
challenge-response approach between clients and cloud authentication service [22]. As illustrated in Figure 
5, such an approach employs a blinding random vector as an essential ingredient of a one-time 
representation of multi-factor biometric that prevents replay attacks and enhances the security of the 
MFBA. The production of one-time, fresh revocable biometric template is based on transformations that 
are generated fresh with contribution from both the client and the cloud authentication server to provide 
the non-repudiation feature. 
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Figure 5. Multi-factor one-time biometric representation based on challenge/response for remote cloud 
authentication (adapted from [22]]) 
2.2. Recent solutions to address the security in cloud environment   
Next we discuss some recently proposed solutions that provide security in the cloud environment. 
 Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) 
Data sharing between different parties is a key feature of cloud computing. As discussed earlier, data 
should be encrypted before being migrated to cloud environments to ensure the security of cloud storage. 
The main challenge associated with using symmetric/ asymmetric keys encryption is how to securely store 
and exchange the keys between different parties in an open environment such as cloud computing. The 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) has been providing a practical solution for session key exchange for many 
web services. The key limitation of the PKI solution is not only the need for a trusted third partly (e.g. 
certificate authority) but also the missing link between data owner and the encryption keys. 
To link encryption keys with users’ identities in cloud environments, Attribute Based Encryption 
(ABE) has been recently proposed as a new formulation of public/private key infrastructure in which the 
encryption keys are directly derived from a user’s identity [23]. In traditional public-key encryption, a 
message is encrypted for a specific receiver using the receiver’s public-key whereas ABE revolutionize 
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this idea by linking the public key with the identity (e.g. email address) and/or the attribute (e.g. roles) of 
the receiver. Thus, the key feature of ABE is to enable data owners to share encrypted data with a set of 
individuals who have a matching set of attributes.  
For example, ABE enables the head of a computing department to encrypt a document and share it 
with members of staff who have attributes {lecturers, admission committee, exam committee}.  A threshold 
to specify the minimum number of required attributes can be used to offer better level of flexibility on who 
can access the data. In the above example, if the threshold is set to 2, then any staff member with at least 
two of the three attributes would be able to decrypt the message.  The encryption and decryption keys are 
generated by a trusted third parity based on a set of descriptive attributes as illustrated in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6. General Attribute-Based Encryption Architecture (adapted from [24]) 
The following sub-sections further explain the two main extensions of ABE approaches proposed, namely 
the Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and the Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE).  
Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) 
The KP-ABE was initially proposed by Goyal et al. [24] to provide a development version of ABE. In KP-
APE, data owners generate a master key to encrypt the data in such a way that the corresponding ciphertext 
is labelled with a set of attributes. The decryption key (private key) given to the user is associated with an 
access policy (i.e. a tree-like access structure that specifies which ciphertext the key can decrypt). The 
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leaves of the tree-like access policy are associated with attributes of the users. As a result, a user can decrypt 
a ciphertext if and only if the attributes associated with the ciphertext satisfy the key access structure. 
One application of KP-APE could be the encryption of Audit Log Entries of a big organization. Suppose 
the entries have the following structure {user name, date and time of action, type of action}, and a forensic 
analyst is assigned the task of carrying out a particular investigation on the log. If the entries are encrypted 
using a traditional cryptography, the analyst needs a secret key which will enable him/her to decrypt and 
access ALL entries. However, in KP-APE, the analyst would be issued a secret key associated with a 
specific access structure, through which the corresponding decryption key enables a particular kind of 
encrypted search such as accessing log entries whose attributes satisfied the conditions {“username = John” 
OR (access date between 01/01/2017 and 01/06/2017)}. The KP-APE also makes it unfeasible for multiple 
analysts to access unauthorized entries from the audit log even if they collaborate and share their keys [24]. 
Another simple example of KP-ABE is illustrated in Figure 7.  
  
 
Figure 7. Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption model (adapted from [24]) 
Figure 7 shows a simple access structure which dictates who can retrieve the decryption keys.  In this case, 
Alice would be able to access the decryption key and unlock the ciphertext or part of it if and only if his/her 
attributes satisfy the corresponding access structure (i.e. she has to be a {Dean OR (a member of Computing 
Department AND Exam committee) OR (she belongs to two of the three: Lectures, Exam Committee , 
Admin Office)}). 
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Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) 
The main limitation of the KP-ABE is that data owners have no control over who can access the encrypted 
messages because the access policy which is typically managed by a third party Public Key Generator 
(PKG) is not attached with the ciphertext (i.e. the access policy controls the access to the decryption keys 
instead of controlling the access to ciphertext). On the other hand, the Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based 
Encryption (CP-ABE) shifts the focus to the ciphertext by giving data owners the power of locking their 
encrypted data with different access policies (i.e. for each message they can decide on who can decrypt that 
particular message as illustrated in Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Ciphertext Attribute-Based Encryption Model (adapted from [9])  
The example given in Figure 8 demonstrates the flexibility provided to by CP-ABE in locking different 
messages with different access structures (i.e. data owners are able to choose access policies based on the 
sensitivity and the security of their encrypted messages). For example, the figure shows that the encrypted 
message in this scenario can be only decrypted by the Dean OR (a member of both Computing and 
Examination staff). 
Standard Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) 
The first proposal of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) was presented by [25] as an alternative approach to 
traditional public-key encryption in which the public key of a user is some unique information about the 
identity of the user such as email address. If Alice wants to send a secure message to Bob, she can use the 
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text-value of his email address as an encryption key using the public parameters of the system stored on 
the PKG. The basic concept of IBE can be illustrated as in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Example of Identity-Based Encryption architecture (adapted from [25]) 
The figure shows that Alice sends Bob a message encrypted using Bob’s Identity such as email, phone 
number, and so on even if Bob has no public key certificate. The private decryption key is then retrieved 
from the PKG which holds public parameters as well as the master secret key msk. IBE scheme can offer 
more power to Alice because she can apply more restrictions on her encrypted message by adding more 
roles to Bob’s ID such as {Bob’s email, Access time/data, Role}.  
3. Biometric solutions for cloud computing  
3.1. Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption  
The initial idea of Fuzzy Identity Based Encryption (F-IBE) was presented in [23] where the identity was 
modelled as a set of descriptive attributes. The key feature of F-IBE is that the private key of an identity 𝑥 
has an ability to decrypt a ciphertext that has been encrypted with another identity 𝑦 if and only if the 
distance between 𝑥 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑦 is less than or equal to a certain threshold value. The F-IBE plays a key role in 
PKG
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utilizing biometric data such as a fingerprints or face images as identity. F-IBE is a promising solution that 
bridges the gap between the exactness of encryption/decryption keys and the fuzziness of biometric data 
(i.e. the enrolled biometric samples and the freshly captured ones are never the same).  This feature enables 
a private key of biometric identity to decrypt a message that was encrypted with a public key of a slightly 
different biometric identity.  
It can be argued that the weakness associated with the use of traditional IBE is that the identity such as a 
"name” or “email” needs to be authenticated first before retrieving the corresponding decryption key in [6] 
[26] [7]. Therefore, the user might need to provide additional "supplementary documents" to link the name 
and or the email with her identity. In contrast, the biometric-based F-IBE offers a natural way of 
authentication by providing biometric data, which is part of user’s identity, to retrieve the decryption private 
key. It has been proved that F-IBE can withstand collusion attacks (i.e. a group of users cannot integrate 
their keys in a manner that enables them to decrypt messages without individual permission).  
In F-IBE, the user's private key is a set of n private components or features the are linked within the 
identity of the user. Shamir's secret sharing  [25] is typically employed to distribute the master secret key 
over the components of the private key by using a polynomial of degree (d-1) where d<=n is the minimum 
number of private components that the user needs to present to retrieve the decryption (private) key. Figure 
10 shows an example of two identities X and Y where the number of overlapped features is 16 out of 20 
features.  If the threshold d is set to be 16 or less, then the two identities will be deemed to be the same. 
 
Figure 10. Two identifies X, Y with 16 out of 20 overlap  
3.2. Recently proposed biometric solutions 
BIOmetric Identity Based Encryption (BIO-IBE) is an interesting application derived from F_IBE, in which 
the identity x is a feature vector (𝑓ଵ, 𝑓ଶ, … , 𝑓௡) of size n that is extracted from biometric data using a 
particular feature extractor technique. On the other hand, the identity x' represents a feature vector 
(𝑓′ଵ, 𝑓′ଶ, … , 𝑓′௡) extracted from a fresh biometric query. A polynomial of degree (𝒅 -1) is used to distribute 
and reconstruct the secret value over set of overlapping feature between x and x' in such away |𝒙 ∩ 𝒙′| ≥
𝒅. Interpolating the subset of 𝑑-features would be enough to reconstruct the secret value and decrypt the 
ciphertext (encrypted by public key of identity x) using the private key components of identity x'. 
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The second application of the F-IBE is ABE, in which a set descriptive attributes are used to 
encrypt/decrypt a message. For example, the following attributes {Applied computing department, Staff 
member, age >=40, exam committee member} can be used during encryption. At the decryption stage, 
anyone has who d-attributes (e.g. 3 out of 4 attribute) should be able to decrypt the message. If d=3, then a 
person with {Dept =Applied computing, staff member, age= 42} will be able to decrypt the message.  
In [27], IBE was developed to build a new scheme of digital signature based on the so-called identity based 
signature in which the sender uses the recipient's biometric template to encrypt a message. The recipient 
then authenticate himself/herself to the PKG by presenting a fresh biometric template.  The recipient then 
will be able to decrypt the message if the distance between the two templates is less that a pre-define 
threshold. In [28], a new protocol for key exchange using biometric identity based encryption was proposed 
to enable parties to securely exchange cryptographic keys even when an adversary is monitoring the 
communication channel between the parties. The protocol combines biometrics with IBE in order to 
provide a secure way to access symmetric keys based on the identity of the users in the unsecure 
environment.  
The message is first encrypted by the data owner using a traditional symmetric key before migrating it to a 
cloud storage. The symmetric key is then encrypted using public biometrics of the users selected by the 
data owner to decrypt the message based on Fuzzy Identity-Based Encryption. Only the selected users will 
be able to decrypt the message by providing a fresh sample of their biometric data. Such a solution 
eliminates the needs for a key distribution center in traditional cryptography and gives the data owner the 
power of fine-grained sharing of encrypted data by controlling who can access his/her data.   
As illustrated in Figure 10, the key stages of the biometric based IBE framework to exchange keys for 
sharing encrypted data in the cloud environment [28]  are: 
 Alice encrypts her data using traditional encryption (symmetric/ asymmetric) techniques such as 
AES or RSA. 
ℇெ ⟵  𝐸𝑛𝑐( 𝑠𝑘, 𝑀)                                                   
Where 𝑠𝑘 is the encryption key, M is the original message, and ℇெ is the encrypted message 
 She stores the encrypted data in a cloud environment.  
 Now, if Alice wants to allow Bob to decrypt the message, she encrypts the encryption key sk using 
a public key of Bob's unique identity w' (i.e., Bob's biometric such as a photo of his face) to produce 
ℇ௦௞ . 
     ℇ௦௞ ⟵  𝐸𝑛𝑐( 𝑝𝑘௜ௗ , 𝑠𝑘)                                                 
Where 𝑝𝑘௜ௗ  is the public key of Bob’s identity, and ℇ௦௞ is the encrypted secret key. 
 Alice sends the output ℇ௦௞  to Bob.  
 To get the sk, Bob needs to provide a fresh biometric sample w.  
 If and only if the overlap between w and w' is greater than a threshold value, Bob will retrieve the 
corresponding private key of his identity and decrypt the ciphertext to get the sk.  
    𝑠𝑘 ⟵  𝐷𝑒𝑐( 𝑠𝑘௜ௗ , 𝑠𝑘)                                                   
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 Bob brings the encrypted data stored in the cloud environment to his local device, and uses sk to 
retrieve the original message/data.  
    𝑀 ⟵  𝐷𝑒𝑐( 𝑠𝑘, ℇெ)                                                   
It can be argued that since the face biometric data, for example, is public between parties who know each 
other, it can be obtained from many resources such as social media resources (e.g., Facebook, Instagram, 
etc.). Hence, face recognition is an ideal biometric trait for our proposal.  
 
Figure 11. Biometric based IBE framework to exchange keys for sharing encrypted data in cloud 
environment (adapted from [29]) 
4. Challenges, Solutions, and Future Research Directions  
While the use of biometric data provides a great level of convenience by eliminating the need to remember 
complex passwords or carrying security tokens, it raises serious questions as to whether, and to what extent, 
the privacy of the biometric owners can be breached. The fact that we are surrounded by more and more 
biometric sensors that can capture our biometric traits may eventually limit our privacy in one way or 
another. The convenience of using biometrics for cloud based authentication could lead to the loss of 
privacy as a result of being tracked in in many of our daily life activities. Moreover, recent research into 
biometrics shows that more and more personal information can be revealed from biometric raw data and 
templates such as gender, age, ethnicity, and even some critical health problems including diabetes, vision 
 
 
 
1. 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑎 𝑠𝑦𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑘𝑒𝑦 𝑠𝑘  2. 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑘  
3. 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐵𝑜𝑏′𝑠 Identity 
 
6. 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 𝑠𝑘 𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑘𝑒𝑦 𝑜𝑓  𝐵𝑜𝑏 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 (𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒 +PP+ msk) 
 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 and master secret  parameters  
7. 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑘 
Bob 
PKG 
Alice 
4. 𝑏.  𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑃  
5. 𝐸𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑦𝑝𝑡 𝑠𝑘 𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑘𝑒𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑜𝑏 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 (ℎ𝑖𝑠 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑒 +PP
) 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑢𝑑 
Al-Assam, H., Hassan, W. and Zeadally, S., 2019. Automated Biometric Authentication with Cloud Computing. In 
Biometric-Based Physical and Cybersecurity Systems (pp. 455-475). Springer, Cham. 
problems, Alzheimer’s disease, and so on [30]. Such personal and sometime confidential information might 
be used to discriminate against individuals when it comes to insurance, jobs, border entry enforcement, and 
many other issues. Therefore, the challenges in biometric research activities have been expanding to include 
the maintenance of user’s privacy in biometric based systems in addition to the traditional work on 
enhancing accuracy, scalability, and usability.  
In cloud computing, the challenge of incorporating biometrics for robust authentication is not only related 
to designing a system that is highly accurate and convenient to use but it should also provide an acceptable 
level of user privacy. The big question here “do users understand the level of invasion into their privacy as 
a direct result of improving the security of their data or applications?” The answer is rather tricky because 
the acceptable level of privacy invasion is not yet clearly defined in the trade-off between security and 
privacy. Academic efforts have not stopped over the last few years to come up with a common 
understanding of the security-privacy trade-off at different levels, which aims to propose best practices and 
guidelines to national and international policymakers. For example, the SurPRISE (Surveillance, Privacy 
and Security) project (2012-2015) [31] was an EU funded project that aimed to examine the trade-off 
between security and individual privacy and addresses the difficult questions of “Does more security justify 
less privacy?” and “What is the balance between these two?” in which different security-related 
technologies and measures were evaluated. 
4.1. Privacy-Preserving Biometric for Cloud Authentication 
Combining challenge/response approach with revocable biometrics generated from UBTs could lead to 
developing an effective privacy-preserving cloud-based biometric authentication [22].  
At the enrolment stage and to address the privacy concerns highlighted earlier, only a revocable biometric 
features XAC and a hash of a PIN used to generate user-based transformation are stored in the cloud 
authenticator’s database as illustrated in Figure 12. As an example, a client captures an image of his/her 
face using his/her mobile’s camera and key in a 4-digit PIN to produce a UBT. It has been shown that such 
a transformation improves privacy without compromising on accuracy [22].  
During the authentication stage, the client captures a fresh biometric sample and applies the same UBT to 
produce a revocable feature vector XC, which is then combined with a one-time random vector V generated 
by the cloud authentication server. After the output is shuffled using a permutation key generated from the 
PIN. Due to the variation between the freshly captured sample and the enrolled template, error correcting 
codes such Reed-Solomon can be used. At the cloud authenticator server, if the error correcting codes was 
successful, the cloud service produces a key K’ that matches the original key if the distance between the 
biometric template (stored at the cloud authenticator database) and the fresh biometric sample is less than 
agreed threshold (i.e., they both belong to one client). 
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Figure 12. Authentication stage of the privacy-aware authentication scheme for cloud service (adapted 
from [22]) 
 
4.2. Conclusion and future research direction 
While biometric-based cloud authentication can provide a convenient way to manage access control to 
cloud resources, biometric data can be misused to track individuals and leak confidential information 
related to health, gender, ethnicity, and so on. It can be argued that privacy of cloud-based biometric 
authentication cannot be solely addressed by technical means. Therefore, there is an urgent need for new 
legislation to enforce privacy-aware measures on cloud service providers related to biometric collection, 
data processing, and template storage. Although some types of regulation related to users’ privacy and data 
protection do exist in many countries, many of these regulations related to managing the privacy and 
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security of biometric data are either not there yet or insufficient. In the end, technical solutions have to 
complement legal frameworks to enforce certain measures on cloud authentication services, which would 
eventually lead to wider public acceptance of biometric based solutions. 
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